> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://glide-9da73dea.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Receipt (v1)

> Tool-call receipt persisted in activity_log after a money-touching MCP call settles.

After every successful MCP tool call, the gateway writes a `Receipt` row to the `activity_log` table. The append-only Postgres trigger (F4 IRON RULE) prevents tampering: UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE rejected unless the admin DSAR session var is set.

## Canonical URL

[`https://glide.co/schemas/agent-banking/v1/receipt.json`](https://glide.co/schemas/agent-banking/v1/receipt.json)

## Required fields

| Field | Type | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `eventType` | `string` | `tool_call`, `step_up_completed`, `policy_change`, `kill_switch`, etc. |
| `timestamp` | `string` (ISO 8601) | UTC instant. |
| `agentId` | `string` | Acting agent (matches grant's `act.sub`). |
| `principalUserId` | `string` | Principal user (matches grant's `sub`). |
| `vaultId` | `string` | Resource vault (matches grant's `aud.vault_id`). |
| `toolName` | `string` | Which tool was called (e.g. `x402.pay`, `payments.initiate`). |
| `endpoint` | `'read' \| 'write' \| 'treasury'` | Confused-deputy isolation tier. |
| `inputDigest` | `string` (hex) | SHA-256 of the redacted input. |
| `outputDigest` | `string` (hex) | SHA-256 of the redacted output. |
| `riskVerdict` | `'pass' \| 'flag' \| 'block'` | Anomaly detector verdict. |
| `policyVersion` | `number` | Envelope version at call time. |
| `grantId` | `string` | The grant's `jti`. |
| `latencyMs` | `number` | End-to-end tool latency. |

## Optional fields

| Field | Type | When populated |
| - | - | - |
| `onChainTxHash` | `string` | Money-movement tools after F1 RPC verify settles. |
| `onChainAmount` | `number` (USD cents) | Same. From `serverFetchChainTx`, never from facilitator receipt. |
| `stepUpSigil` | `string` | Step-up tools after the principal's biometric approval. |
| `redactedFieldsBitmap` | `number` | Bit-flags for fields redacted via DSAR (F4). |

## F-rule enforcement points

| Rule | What's enforced on the Receipt |
| - | - |
| **F1** | `onChainTxHash` + `onChainAmount` come from RPC, not facilitator. |
| **F4** | The row is append-only by Postgres trigger. Admin redaction requires session var + `redactedFieldsBitmap` match. |
| **F5** | `policyVersion` mismatch with current envelope blocks the row write. |

## Replay rendering

DSAR redaction does NOT delete the row. It nulls specific fields + sets `redactedFieldsBitmap`. The replay UI renders the row with `[REDACTED]` watermark over redacted fields — historical existence preserved.

## Example

```json theme={null}
{
  "eventType": "tool_call",
  "timestamp": "2026-04-25T18:23:45.123Z",
  "agentId": "agent_01H8...",
  "principalUserId": "user_01H7...",
  "vaultId": "vault_01HA...",
  "toolName": "x402.pay",
  "endpoint": "write",
  "inputDigest": "abc123...",
  "outputDigest": "def456...",
  "riskVerdict": "pass",
  "policyVersion": 7,
  "grantId": "grant_01HC...",
  "latencyMs": 142,
  "onChainTxHash": "0xdeadbeef...",
  "onChainAmount": 50
}
```

## Reading list

* [Money-safety contracts](https://glide-9da73dea.mintlify.site/oss/concepts/money-safety-contracts.md) — F1 (RPC verify) + F4 (append-only).
* [Threat model](https://glide-9da73dea.mintlify.site/oss/security/threat-model.md) — T4 (audit-log tampering) + T11 (DSAR loophole).


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